Toward a study of bidding processes part IV ‐ games with unknown costs
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Publication:5635296
Cited in
(30)- Existence of an equilibrium in first price auctions
- Static game theory models and their applications in management science
- Adversarial Risk Analysis for Auctions Using Mirror Equilibrium and Bayes Nash Equilibrium
- Necessary and sufficient conditions for peace: implementability versus security
- Competitive bidding in asymmetric multidimensional public procurement
- The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions
- Competitive bidding and proprietary information
- First-price auctions where one of the bidders' valuations is common knowledge
- On the Complexity of Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions
- Asymmetric first price auctions
- Comparative statics in first price auctions
- \(k\)-price auctions
- Biased procurement auctions
- Adversarial risk analysis for auctions using non-strategic play and level-k thinking: A general case of n bidders with regret
- Numerical Solution of Asymmetric Auctions
- Three minimal market institutions with human and algorithmic agents: theory and experimental evidence
- Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case
- Characterization and computation of Nash-equilibria for auctions with incomplete information
- Revenue and efficiency effects of resale in first-price auctions
- Pure strategy equilibria of single and double auctions with interdependent values
- Bilateral \(k+1\)-price auctions with asymmetric shares and values
- Multidimensional private value auctions
- Asymptotic revenue equivalence of asymmetric auctions with interdependent values
- Adversarial risk analysis for first‐price sealed‐bid auctions
- Procurement auctions with capacity constrained suppliers
- Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
- First-price auction symmetric equilibria with a general distribution
- Auctioning Böhm-Bawerk's horses
- Government procurement and asymmetric rebate auctions
- Pre-auction offers in asymmetric first-price and second-price auctions
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