Toward a study of bidding processes part IV ‐ games with unknown costs

DOI10.1002/NAV.3800140402zbMATH Open0227.90072OpenAlexW2110933102MaRDI QIDQ5635296FDOQ5635296

Authors: James H. Griesmer, R. E. Levitan, Martin Shubik 

Publication date: 1967

Published in: Naval Research Logistics Quarterly (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.3800140402

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cited In (30)

• Adversarial Risk Analysis for Auctions Using Mirror Equilibrium and Bayes Nash Equilibrium
• On the Complexity of Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions
• Government procurement and asymmetric rebate auctions
• Existence of an equilibrium in first price auctions
• Adversarial risk analysis for auctions using non-strategic play and level-k thinking: A general case of n bidders with regret
• Necessary and sufficient conditions for peace: implementability versus security
• Bilateral \(k+1\)-price auctions with asymmetric shares and values
• Competitive bidding and proprietary information
• Biased procurement auctions
• First-price auction symmetric equilibria with a general distribution
• Comparative statics in first price auctions
• \(k\)-price auctions
• Static game theory models and their applications in management science
• First-price auctions where one of the bidders' valuations is common knowledge
• Three minimal market institutions with human and algorithmic agents: theory and experimental evidence
• Procurement auctions with capacity constrained suppliers
• Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case
• Adversarial risk analysis for first‐price sealed‐bid auctions
• Asymptotic revenue equivalence of asymmetric auctions with interdependent values
• Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
• Pure strategy equilibria of single and double auctions with interdependent values
• Competitive bidding in asymmetric multidimensional public procurement
• Characterization and computation of Nash-equilibria for auctions with incomplete information
• Revenue and efficiency effects of resale in first-price auctions
• Numerical Solution of Asymmetric Auctions
• Multidimensional private value auctions
• Pre-auction offers in asymmetric first-price and second-price auctions
• Auctioning Böhm-Bawerk's horses
• The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions
• Asymmetric first price auctions

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