Toward a study of bidding processes part IV ‐ games with unknown costs

DOI10.1002/NAV.3800140402MaRDI QIDQ5635296zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors James H. Griesmer, R. E. Levitan, Martin Shubik

Publication date 1967

Published in Naval Research Logistics Quarterly (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.3800140402

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cited in

(30)

• Existence of an equilibrium in first price auctions
• Static game theory models and their applications in management science
• Adversarial Risk Analysis for Auctions Using Mirror Equilibrium and Bayes Nash Equilibrium
• Necessary and sufficient conditions for peace: implementability versus security
• Competitive bidding in asymmetric multidimensional public procurement
• The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions
• Competitive bidding and proprietary information
• First-price auctions where one of the bidders' valuations is common knowledge
• On the Complexity of Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions
• Asymmetric first price auctions
• Comparative statics in first price auctions
• \(k\)-price auctions
• Biased procurement auctions
• Adversarial risk analysis for auctions using non-strategic play and level-k thinking: A general case of n bidders with regret
• Numerical Solution of Asymmetric Auctions
• Three minimal market institutions with human and algorithmic agents: theory and experimental evidence
• Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case
• Characterization and computation of Nash-equilibria for auctions with incomplete information
• Revenue and efficiency effects of resale in first-price auctions
• Pure strategy equilibria of single and double auctions with interdependent values
• Bilateral \(k+1\)-price auctions with asymmetric shares and values
• Multidimensional private value auctions
• Asymptotic revenue equivalence of asymmetric auctions with interdependent values
• Adversarial risk analysis for first‐price sealed‐bid auctions
• Procurement auctions with capacity constrained suppliers
• Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
• First-price auction symmetric equilibria with a general distribution
• Auctioning Böhm-Bawerk's horses
• Government procurement and asymmetric rebate auctions
• Pre-auction offers in asymmetric first-price and second-price auctions

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