Biased procurement auctions

DOI10.1007/S00199-008-0346-8MaRDI QIDQ1003106zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors George Leonardo Rezende

Publication date 26 February 2009

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0346-8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Preferential treatment in procurement auctions through information revelation
• Buyer's optimal information revelation strategy in procurement auctions
• A note on information revelation in procurement auctions
• Dynamics in non-binding procurement auctions with boundedly rational bidders
• Information policies in procurement auctions with heterogeneous suppliers

Cites work

• A Multistage Model of Bargaining
• Asymmetric Auctions
• Bribery and Favoritism by Auctioneers in Sealed-Bid Auctions
• Communication and Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games of Incomplete Information
• Comparing competition and collusion: a numerical approach.
• Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions
• Existence of an equilibrium in first price auctions
• Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the Coase conjecture
• Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions
• Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design
• Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing
• Optimal Auction Design
• Price discrimination through transactions bundling: The case of monopsony
• Toward a study of bidding processes part IV ‐ games with unknown costs

Cited in

(17)

• Dynamics in non-binding procurement auctions with boundedly rational bidders
• Preferential treatment in procurement auctions through information revelation
• WELFARE LOSS IN LINEAR PRICE-PREFERENCE PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS
• Is there a bias toward excessive quality in defense procurement?
• On the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
• Interim bribery in auctions
• Introduction to the symposium
• When (and how) to favor incumbents in optimal dynamic procurement auctions
• Efficiency versus optimality in procurement
• Comparing first and second price auctions with asymmetric bidders
• Buyer's optimal information revelation strategy in procurement auctions
• A multi-attribute reverse auction model on margin bidding
• COMPARING PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS
• A note on information revelation in procurement auctions
• Information policies in procurement auctions with heterogeneous suppliers
• Optimal procurement mechanisms: bidding on price and damages for breach
• A model of a two-stage all-pay auction

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