Dynamics in non-binding procurement auctions with boundedly rational bidders

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-04023-8_10zbMATH Open1189.37110OpenAlexW2104254718MaRDI QIDQ3569481FDOQ3569481

Vincenzo Valori, Domenico Colucci, Nicola Doni

Publication date: 21 June 2010

Published in: Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics, Finance and Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.disei.unifi.it/upload/sub/pubblicazioni/repec/flo/workingpapers/storicodimad/2009/dimadwp2009-06.pdf

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Dynamical systems in optimization and economics (37N40)

Cited In (4)

• Biased procurement auctions
• The dynamics of bidding markets with financial constraints
• When (and how) to favor incumbents in optimal dynamic procurement auctions
• E-sourcing in Procurement: Theory and Behavior in Reverse Auctions with Noncompetitive Contracts

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