Dynamics in non-binding procurement auctions with boundedly rational bidders

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-04023-8_10MaRDI QIDQ3569481zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Domenico Colucci, Nicola Doni, Vincenzo Valori

Publication date 21 June 2010

Published in Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics, Finance and Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.disei.unifi.it/upload/sub/pubblicazioni/repec/flo/workingpapers/storicodimad/2009/dimadwp2009-06.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Dynamical systems in optimization and economics (37N40)

Recommendations

• Buyer's optimal information revelation strategy in procurement auctions
• Information policies in procurement auctions with heterogeneous suppliers
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Cited in

(9)

• E-sourcing in Procurement: Theory and Behavior in Reverse Auctions with Noncompetitive Contracts
• Biased procurement auctions
• When (and how) to favor incumbents in optimal dynamic procurement auctions
• The dynamics of bidding markets with financial constraints
• On the regulation of procurement bids
• Buyer's optimal information revelation strategy in procurement auctions
• Robust screens for noncompetitive bidding in procurement auctions
• A note on information revelation in procurement auctions
• Information policies in procurement auctions with heterogeneous suppliers

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