Probabilistic procurement auctions
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Publication:490944
DOI10.1007/S10058-014-0161-6zbMATH Open1329.91047OpenAlexW3122532995MaRDI QIDQ490944FDOQ490944
Publication date: 21 August 2015
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp4320.pdf
Recommendations
Cites Work
- The theory of contests: a survey
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- Information in conflicts.
- Contest success functions
- Multi-player contests with asymmetric information
- Incomplete information in rent-seeking contests
- Group contest success functions
- Foundations for contest success functions
- Micro foundations of multi-prize lottery contests: a perspective of noisy performance ranking
- Endogenous contest success functions: a mechanism design approach
- Multi-activity contests
- A note on Bayesian Nash equilibria in imperfectly discriminating contests
Cited In (7)
- Bundled Payments For Healthcare Services: Proposer Selection and Information Sharing
- Implementing optimal procurement auctions with exogenous quality.
- Procurement (Reverse) Auctions Where Service Providers have Official Ratings
- Innovation contests with entry auction
- COMPARING PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS
- Optimal Procurement Mechanisms
- Is there a bias toward excessive quality in defense procurement?
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