Bundled Payments For Healthcare Services: Proposer Selection and Information Sharing

DOI10.1287/opre.2015.1403zbMath1329.91049OpenAlexW2161684748MaRDI QIDQ3465580

Mili Mehrotra, Diwakar Gupta

Publication date: 22 January 2016

Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/04cbcdfb01445feffb6a699a33ca9aed7474e0c0

zbMATH Keywords

healthcaregovernmentagenciesgames/group decisionsbidding/auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Medical applications (general) (92C50) Group preferences (91B10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (3)

Design of Incentive Programs for Optimal Medication Adherence in the Presence of Observable Consumption ⋮ Coordinated Patient Appointment Scheduling for a Multistation Healthcare Network ⋮ Data-Driven Incentive Design in the Medicare Shared Savings Program

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Probabilistic procurement auctions
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Log-concave probability and its applications
• Deterministic versus stochastic mechanisms in principal -- agent models
• Auctions of Shares
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
• Optimal Auction Design
• Bidding for Contests

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