Bundled payments for healthcare services: proposer selection and information sharing
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Recommendations
- Data-driven incentive design in the medicare shared savings program
- Voluntary regulation: evidence from medicare payment reform
- Optimizing healthcare network design under reference pricing and parameter uncertainty
- A goal programming approach to address the proposal selection problem: a case study of a clinical and translational science institute
- Exploring the potential of data envelopment analysis for enhancing pay-for-performance programme design in primary health care
Cites work
- Auctions of Shares
- Bidding for Contests
- Comparison methods for stochastic models and risks
- Deterministic versus stochastic mechanisms in principal -- agent models
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Log-concave probability and its applications
- Optimal Auction Design
- Probabilistic procurement auctions
- Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
Cited in
(6)- Optimizing healthcare network design under reference pricing and parameter uncertainty
- Payment models to coordinate healthcare providers: extension to risk-averse providers
- Voluntary regulation: evidence from medicare payment reform
- Design of incentive programs for optimal medication adherence in the presence of observable consumption
- Coordinated Patient Appointment Scheduling for a Multistation Healthcare Network
- Data-driven incentive design in the medicare shared savings program
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