Design of Incentive Programs for Optimal Medication Adherence in the Presence of Observable Consumption
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Publication:5095170
DOI10.1287/opre.2021.2227zbMath1497.90101OpenAlexW4210924074MaRDI QIDQ5095170
Diana M. Negoescu, Sze-chuan Suen, Joel Weiqiang Goh
Publication date: 5 August 2022
Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2021.2227
Deterministic scheduling theory in operations research (90B35) Medical applications (general) (92C50)
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