Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1169928
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(83)90120-5zbMath0495.90031OpenAlexW1995959404MaRDI QIDQ1169928
Publication date: 1983
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/25302
principal-agent modelincentive schemeslimitations on the maximum penaltylimited liability contractsoptimal strategy of the principal
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Cites Work
- Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
- A two-person game of information transmission
- Optimal Nonuniform Prices
- Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
- An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
- Monopoly, Non-Linear Pricing and Imperfect Information: The Insurance Market
- An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
