Sequential communication with ex post participation constraints

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2007.01.001zbMATH Open1132.91312OpenAlexW3121249947MaRDI QIDQ2469872FDOQ2469872

Authors: Stefan Ambec 

Publication date: 11 February 2008

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/2814/1/ambec.pdf

Recommendations

• Sequential rationality, implementation and pre-play communication
• Sequential equilibria in Bayesian games with communication
• Ex ante contracting with endogenously determined communication plans
• Information design and sequential screening with ex post participation constraint
• Ex ante contracting with endogenously determined communication plans

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationimplementationprincipal-agentcontract theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

Cites Work

• Game theory
• Microeconomic theory
• Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules
• An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
• A Sequential Solution to the Public Goods Problem

Cited In (3)

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Ex ante contracting with endogenously determined communication plans
• Communication and coordination with constraints

This page was built for publication: Sequential communication with ex post participation constraints

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2469872)