Subjective evaluation versus public information
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Publication:272293
DOI10.1007/s00199-016-0953-8zbMath1367.91095OpenAlexW1843367827MaRDI QIDQ272293
Helmut Bester, Johannes Münster
Publication date: 20 April 2016
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15340/1/399.pdf
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Cites Work
- Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information
- Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
- Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
- The interaction of implicit and explicit contracts in repeated agency
- On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems
- Relational contracts in a persistent environment
- Subjective Performance and the Value of Blind Evaluation
- Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
- Multistage Games with Communication
- An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
- Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts
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