Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2012.05.008zbMath1247.91094MaRDI QIDQ449184

Helmut Bester, Daniel Krähmer

Publication date: 12 September 2012

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13301/1/251.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete contracts; asymmetric information; option contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B44: Economics of information

Related Items

Subjective evaluation versus public information, Stackelberg game model of railway freight pricing based on option theory

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