Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information
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Publication:449184
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2012.05.008zbMath1247.91094OpenAlexW2108528712MaRDI QIDQ449184
Publication date: 12 September 2012
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13301/1/251.pdf
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Cites Work
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