Deterministic versus stochastic mechanisms in principal -- agent models
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Publication:2496238
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2004.11.008zbMath1153.91378OpenAlexW2243358540MaRDI QIDQ2496238
Publication date: 12 July 2006
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.11.008
Fundamental topics (basic mathematics, methodology; applicable to economics in general) (91B02) Probabilistic measure theory (60A10)
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