Informed principal with correlation

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.01.007zbMath1152.91372MaRDI QIDQ2519479

Michela Cella

Publication date: 26 January 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:2db1d0ac-3f83-4dd2-87bb-93428ff2fa24

zbMATH Keywords

correlation; informed principal; private values

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B44: Economics of information

Related Items

Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values, The strategically ignorant principal, An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values, Informed principal and countervailing incentives, Two-sided strategic information transmission, Informed principal problems in bilateral trading

Cites Work

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• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design