Informed principal with correlation
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2519479
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.01.007zbMath1152.91372MaRDI QIDQ2519479
Publication date: 26 January 2009
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:2db1d0ac-3f83-4dd2-87bb-93428ff2fa24
91B44: Economics of information
Related Items
Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values, The strategically ignorant principal, An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values, Informed principal and countervailing incentives, Two-sided strategic information transmission, Informed principal problems in bilateral trading
Cites Work
- On the fundamental theorems of general equilibrium
- Optimal contracts with public ex post information
- Deterministic versus stochastic mechanisms in principal -- agent models
- The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
- Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
- Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
- Correlated Information and Mecanism Design