Optimal contracts with public ex post information

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(88)90260-8zbMath0637.90015MaRDI QIDQ1099054

Michael H. Riordan, David E. M. Sappington

Publication date: 1988

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(88)90260-8

zbMATH Keywords

initially uninformed buyer; value of public ex post information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B24: Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets)

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