Optimal contracts with public ex post information
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Publication:1099054
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(88)90260-8zbMath0637.90015OpenAlexW2058004968MaRDI QIDQ1099054
Michael H. Riordan, David E. M. Sappington
Publication date: 1988
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(88)90260-8
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