Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents
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Publication:794886
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(84)90045-0zbMath0541.90001OpenAlexW1990499423MaRDI QIDQ794886
Joel S. Demski, David E. M. Sappington
Publication date: 1984
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(84)90045-0
Nash equilibriumprivate informationprincipal-agent problemdominant strategyoptimal incentive contractsrisk-neutral principaltruth-telling equilibria
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