Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(84)90045-0zbMATH Open0541.90001OpenAlexW1990499423MaRDI QIDQ794886FDOQ794886

Joel S. Demski, David E. M. Sappington

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(84)90045-0

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zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumprivate informationprincipal-agent problemdominant strategyoptimal incentive contractsrisk-neutral principaltruth-telling equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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• Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
• Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
• Asymmetric Information, Incentives and Intrafirm Resource Allocation
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (43)

• Knowledge as a public good: Efficient sharing and incentives for development effort
• Mean–field moral hazard for optimal energy demand response management
• Rank-Order Contracts for a Principal with Many Agents
• Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents
• Ignorance in a multi-agent setting
• Countervailing incentives in agency problems
• Price-volume agreements: a one principal/two agents model
• Wholesale price discrimination with interdependent retailers
• Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion
• Optimal contracts with public ex post information
• Optimal incentive contracts with a spiteful principal: single agent
• Optimal retention in agency problems
• Financial fragility and over-the-counter markets
• Production externalities and two-way distortion in principal-multi-agent problems
• Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise
• Optimal Brokerage Contracts in Almgren–Chriss Model with Multiple Clients
• All-or-nothing payments
• Full implementation of social choice functions in dominant strategies
• Principal-multiagents problem under equivalent changes of measure: general study and an existence result
• Reciprocity in the principal-multiple agent model
• Stopping agents from ``cheating
• Optimal contracting with private knowledge of wealth and ability
• Implementing coordinated team play
• Can labor markets help resolve collusion?
• Multiprincipals multiagents incentive design
• Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules
• Incentive schemes with multiple agents and bankcruptcy constraints
• Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection
• Equity and adverse selection with correlated costs
• The newsvendor's optimal incentive contracts for multiple advertisers
• A note on the dynamics of incentive contracts
• Optimal contracts for agents with adverse selection
• A Tale of a Principal and Many, Many Agents
• On the welfare effects of adverse selection in oligopolistic markets
• Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
• Approximate implementation in the absence of externalities and aggregate feasibility constraints
• A note on the optimal structure of production
• Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types
• The optimality of team contracts
• Correlation and relative performance evaluation
• Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard
• Contracting Theory with Competitive Interacting Agents
• Title not available (Why is that?)

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