Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents (Q794886)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3860816
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| English | Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3860816 |
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Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents (English)
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1984
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The problem of optimal incentive contracts is considered when a single risk-neutral principal contracts with two agents who possess private information about their own productivity and partial information about the partner's one. It is shown that this information may be of no use to risk-neutral agents, however, carries rents to risk-averse ones. The most attention is paid to the truth-telling equilibria that are not Pareto dominated in the agents' subgame. Among all such equilibria, the best for the principal is which restricts one agent to tell the truth as a dominant strategy and the other as the best response to truth.
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Nash equilibrium
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principal-agent problem
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optimal incentive contracts
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risk-neutral principal
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private information
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truth-telling equilibria
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dominant strategy
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0.8409250974655151
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0.8290419578552246
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0.8239454030990601
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0.8165393471717834
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0.8080849647521973
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