Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents
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Cites work
- An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
- Asymmetric Information, Incentives and Intrafirm Resource Allocation
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4143737 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3068103 (Why is no real title available?)
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
- Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
- Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
- Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
- Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
- Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
Cited in
(48)- Ignorance in a multi-agent setting
- Incentive schemes with multiple agents and bankcruptcy constraints
- Optimal contracts with public ex post information
- Stopping agents from ``cheating
- Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules
- Approximate implementation in the absence of externalities and aggregate feasibility constraints
- Optimal retention in agency problems
- Knowledge as a public good: Efficient sharing and incentives for development effort
- Incentive contracts in two-sided moral hazards with multiple agents
- Implementing coordinated team play
- Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types
- Production externalities and two-way distortion in principal-multi-agent problems
- Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection
- Financial fragility and over-the-counter markets
- Reciprocity in the principal-multiple agent model
- Analysis of various optimal contracts in the problem of stimulation of agents by a principal in a model with two agents
- Countervailing incentives in agency problems
- Multiple-task and multiple-agent models: Incentive contracts and an application to point pollution control
- The newsvendor's optimal incentive contracts for multiple advertisers
- Can labor markets help resolve collusion?
- Equity and adverse selection with correlated costs
- A note on the optimal structure of production
- The optimality of team contracts
- Full implementation of social choice functions in dominant strategies
- Wholesale price discrimination with interdependent retailers
- Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard
- Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise
- Price-volume agreements: a one principal/two agents model
- On the welfare effects of adverse selection in oligopolistic markets
- Optimal contracting with private knowledge of wealth and ability
- Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
- Rank-Order Contracts for a Principal with Many Agents
- Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1159201 (Why is no real title available?)
- All-or-nothing payments
- Incentives for unaware agents
- Contracting theory with competitive interacting agents
- A Tale of a Principal and Many, Many Agents
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5260276 (Why is no real title available?)
- Multiprincipals multiagents incentive design
- Mean–field moral hazard for optimal energy demand response management
- Optimal incentive contracts with a spiteful principal: single agent
- Optimal Brokerage Contracts in Almgren–Chriss Model with Multiple Clients
- A note on the dynamics of incentive contracts
- Principal-multiagents problem under equivalent changes of measure: general study and an existence result
- Correlation and relative performance evaluation
- Optimal contracts for agents with adverse selection
- Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion
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