Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents
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The problem of optimal incentive contracts is considered when a single risk-neutral principal contracts with two agents who possess private information about their own productivity and partial information about the partner's one. It is shown that this information may be of no use to risk-neutral agents, however, carries rents to risk-averse ones. The most attention is paid to the truth-telling equilibria that are not Pareto dominated in the agents' subgame. Among all such equilibria, the best for the principal is which restricts one agent to tell the truth as a dominant strategy and the other as the best response to truth.
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Cites work
- An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
- Asymmetric Information, Incentives and Intrafirm Resource Allocation
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4143737 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3068103 (Why is no real title available?)
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
- Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
- Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
- Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
- Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
- Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
Cited in
(48)- Ignorance in a multi-agent setting
- Incentive schemes with multiple agents and bankcruptcy constraints
- Optimal contracts with public ex post information
- Stopping agents from ``cheating
- Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules
- Approximate implementation in the absence of externalities and aggregate feasibility constraints
- Optimal retention in agency problems
- Knowledge as a public good: Efficient sharing and incentives for development effort
- Incentive contracts in two-sided moral hazards with multiple agents
- Implementing coordinated team play
- Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types
- Production externalities and two-way distortion in principal-multi-agent problems
- Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection
- Financial fragility and over-the-counter markets
- Reciprocity in the principal-multiple agent model
- Analysis of various optimal contracts in the problem of stimulation of agents by a principal in a model with two agents
- Countervailing incentives in agency problems
- Multiple-task and multiple-agent models: Incentive contracts and an application to point pollution control
- The newsvendor's optimal incentive contracts for multiple advertisers
- Can labor markets help resolve collusion?
- Equity and adverse selection with correlated costs
- A note on the optimal structure of production
- The optimality of team contracts
- Full implementation of social choice functions in dominant strategies
- Wholesale price discrimination with interdependent retailers
- Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard
- Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise
- Price-volume agreements: a one principal/two agents model
- On the welfare effects of adverse selection in oligopolistic markets
- Optimal contracting with private knowledge of wealth and ability
- Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
- Rank-Order Contracts for a Principal with Many Agents
- Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1159201 (Why is no real title available?)
- All-or-nothing payments
- Incentives for unaware agents
- Contracting theory with competitive interacting agents
- A Tale of a Principal and Many, Many Agents
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5260276 (Why is no real title available?)
- Multiprincipals multiagents incentive design
- Mean–field moral hazard for optimal energy demand response management
- Optimal incentive contracts with a spiteful principal: single agent
- Optimal Brokerage Contracts in Almgren–Chriss Model with Multiple Clients
- A note on the dynamics of incentive contracts
- Principal-multiagents problem under equivalent changes of measure: general study and an existence result
- Correlation and relative performance evaluation
- Optimal contracts for agents with adverse selection
- Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion
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