Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents
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Recommendations
Cited in
(22)- Decentralization and collusion
- Implementing action profiles when agents collude
- Rank-Order Contracts for a Principal with Many Agents
- Incentive contracts in two-sided moral hazards with multiple agents
- Process manipulation in unique implementation
- Implementation with contingent contracts
- Joint production in teams
- Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents
- Efficiency in partnerships with joint monitoring
- Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise
- All-or-nothing payments
- Reporting behavior: a literature review of experimental studies
- Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents
- Reciprocity in the principal-multiple agent model
- Stopping agents from ``cheating
- Implementing coordinated team play
- Implementation in dynamic job transfers
- Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection
- Multi-contracting mechanism design
- Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
- Correlation and relative performance evaluation
- Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard
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