Implementation of optimal contracts under adverse selection
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The authors analyse a 2-agent, 2-type principal-multiagent model of adverse selection under the assumption that the agents each have complete information. The aim of this paper is to find natural mechanisms associated with the new principal-multiagents model introduced. More specifically, the authors have considered for this model five important issues: ``individual rationality, ``renegotiation-proofness, ``finite mechanism, ``unique implemetation and ``undomination of Nash Equilibria.
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Cited in
(19)- Optimal contract mechanisms for principal-agent problems with moral hazard and adverse selection
- Participation constraints in adverse selection models
- Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection
- Adverse selection under ignorance
- Nonparametric adverse selection problems
- On the implementability of contracts without quasilinear utility
- Multitask assignments with adverse selection
- Contract withdrawals and equilibrium in competitive markets with adverse selection
- Solving an infinite horizon adverse selection model through finite policy graphs
- Multi-period contracts between principal and agent with adverse selection
- Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents
- Noisy Observation in Adverse Selection Models
- Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable
- An adverse selection approach to power pricing
- Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard
- Learning approximately optimal contracts
- Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information
- Nash implementation and uncertain renegotiation
- Optimal contracts for agents with adverse selection
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