Optimal stationary contract with two-sided imperfect enforcement and persistent adverse selection

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2017.07.007zbMath1396.91376OpenAlexW2734505990MaRDI QIDQ1782377

Aggey Semenov, Lars Stole, David Martimort

Publication date: 20 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.07.007

zbMATH Keywords

optimal controladverse selectioncontract enforcementstationary contract

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Relational contracts in a persistent environment
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
• A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement
• NONSTATIONARY RELATIONAL CONTRACTS WITH ADVERSE SELECTION*
• Nonlinear pricing with budget constraint

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