Relational contracts in a persistent environment
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Publication:2634144
DOI10.1007/s00199-015-0891-xzbMath1367.91099OpenAlexW610637440MaRDI QIDQ2634144
Publication date: 8 February 2016
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1389208/
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Related Items (2)
Subjective evaluation versus public information ⋮ Optimal stationary contract with two-sided imperfect enforcement and persistent adverse selection
Cites Work
- Promotion tournaments in market equilibrium
- Repeated moral hazard with persistence
- Dynamic managerial compensation: a variational approach
- Efficiency in Games With Markovian Private Information
- Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks
- Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment
- Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
- Relational Contracts in Competitive Labour Markets
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