Relational contracts in a persistent environment

DOI10.1007/s00199-015-0891-xzbMath1367.91099OpenAlexW610637440MaRDI QIDQ2634144

Suehyun Kwon

Publication date: 8 February 2016

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1389208/

zbMATH Keywords

persistencemoral hazardrelational contractshistory-independent contractsstationary contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (2)

Subjective evaluation versus public information ⋮ Optimal stationary contract with two-sided imperfect enforcement and persistent adverse selection

Cites Work

• Promotion tournaments in market equilibrium
• Repeated moral hazard with persistence
• Dynamic managerial compensation: a variational approach
• Efficiency in Games With Markovian Private Information
• Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks
• Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment
• Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
• Relational Contracts in Competitive Labour Markets

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