Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment

DOI10.2307/1912562zbMath0665.90008OpenAlexW1949462001MaRDI QIDQ3818076

James M. Malcomson, W. Bentley MacLeod

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1912562

zbMATH Keywords

labor marketmarket equilibriummoral hazardprincipal-agent modelsinvoluntary unemploymentrenegotiation proofnessenforceability of employment contractsperfect equilibria in a repeated gameself- enforcing implicit contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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