Ex ante payments in self-enforcing risk-sharing contracts

DOI10.1006/JETH.1997.2299zbMATH Open0883.90053OpenAlexW2002365155MaRDI QIDQ1371191FDOQ1371191

Authors: Céline Gauthier, Michel Poitevin, Patrick González 

Publication date: 28 October 1997

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/efe81fc156723b7cde30db4db57e60a817ef0223

Recommendations

• Risk-sharing and optimal contracts with large exogenous risks
• Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard
• Bilateral risk sharing with heterogeneous beliefs and exposure constraints
• Risk sharing contracts with private information and one-sided commitment
• Characterization of a risk sharing contract with one-sided commitment

zbMATH Keywords

long-term risk-sharing contractrisk-averse agentsself-enforcing constraints

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• On the Differentiability of the Value Function in Dynamic Models of Economics
• Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem
• Computing Multi-Period, Information-Constrained Optima
• Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment
• An income fluctuation problem
• On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
• Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment
• A Theory of Wage Dynamics
• Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts
• The permanent income hypothesis: A theoretical formulation

Cited In (2)

• Optimal dynamic risk sharing when enforcement is a decision variable
• Up-front payment under RD rule

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