Ex ante payments in self-enforcing risk-sharing contracts

DOI10.1006/JETH.1997.2299MaRDI QIDQ1371191zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Céline Gauthier, Michel Poitevin, Patrick González

Publication date 28 October 1997

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/efe81fc156723b7cde30db4db57e60a817ef0223

zbMATH Keywords

long-term risk-sharing contractrisk-averse agentsself-enforcing constraints

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Risk-sharing and optimal contracts with large exogenous risks
• Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard
• Bilateral risk sharing with heterogeneous beliefs and exposure constraints
• Risk sharing contracts with private information and one-sided commitment
• Characterization of a risk sharing contract with one-sided commitment

Cites work

• A Theory of Wage Dynamics
• An income fluctuation problem
• Computing Multi-Period, Information-Constrained Optima
• Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment
• Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment
• Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem
• On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
• On the Differentiability of the Value Function in Dynamic Models of Economics
• Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts
• The permanent income hypothesis: A theoretical formulation

Cited in

(2)

• Up-front payment under RD rule
• Optimal dynamic risk sharing when enforcement is a decision variable

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