Risk-sharing and optimal contracts with large exogenous risks
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Publication:6098176
DOI10.1007/s10203-023-00386-1zbMath1518.91123OpenAlexW4319869050MaRDI QIDQ6098176
Stéphane Villeneuve, Jessica Martin
Publication date: 12 June 2023
Published in: Decisions in Economics and Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10203-023-00386-1
Risk models (general) (91B05) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)
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