On optimal sharing rules in discrete- and continuous-time principal-agent problems with exponential utility
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Publication:673263
DOI10.1016/S0165-1889(96)00944-XzbMath0879.90045OpenAlexW2086974719MaRDI QIDQ673263
Heinz Schättler, Jaeyoung Sung
Publication date: 28 February 1997
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1889(96)00944-x
Dynamic programmingStochastic controlIncentivesAgency problemsContinuous-time principal-agent problemsContracts
Related Items (15)
Dynamic Contracting: Accidents Lead to Nonlinear Contracts ⋮ Risk-sharing and optimal contracts with large exogenous risks ⋮ Dynamic programming approach to principal-agent problems ⋮ Optimal contracting with effort and misvaluation ⋮ On the first-order approach in principal-agent models with hidden borrowing and lending ⋮ A continuous-time version of a delegated asset management problem ⋮ A solvable time-inconsistent principal-agent problem ⋮ Contracting Theory with Competitive Interacting Agents ⋮ Dynamic optimal contract under parameter uncertainty with risk-averse agent and principal ⋮ Optimal compensation with adverse selection and dynamic actions ⋮ Incentives and individual motivation in supervised work groups ⋮ A Tale of a Principal and Many, Many Agents ⋮ The first-best sharing rule in the continuous-time principal-agent problem with exponential utility ⋮ Optimal contracting under mean-volatility joint ambiguity uncertainties ⋮ Optimal contracting with moral hazard and behavioral preferences
Cites Work
- The first-order approach to the continuous-time principal-agent problem with exponential utility
- The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
- Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
- Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
- The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I
- Unnamed Item
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