On optimal sharing rules in discrete- and continuous-time principal-agent problems with exponential utility

DOI10.1016/S0165-1889(96)00944-XzbMATH Open0879.90045OpenAlexW2086974719MaRDI QIDQ673263FDOQ673263

Authors: Heinz Schättler, Jaeyoung Sung 

Publication date: 28 February 1997

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1889(96)00944-x

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zbMATH Keywords

Stochastic controlDynamic programmingAgency problemsContinuous-time principal-agent problemsContractsIncentives

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• The first-order approach to the continuous-time principal-agent problem with exponential utility

Cited In (21)

• Incentives and individual motivation in supervised work groups
• A principal-agent problem in continuous time
• Dynamic contracting: accidents lead to nonlinear contracts
• The design and performance of sharing rules for a partnership in continuous time
• Dynamic optimal contract under parameter uncertainty with risk-averse agent and principal
• Optimal contracting with effort and misvaluation
• Contracting theory with competitive interacting agents
• Risk-sharing and optimal contracts with large exogenous risks
• Time-inconsistent contract theory
• On the first-order approach in principal-agent models with hidden borrowing and lending
• A Tale of a Principal and Many, Many Agents
• Optimal compensation with adverse selection and dynamic actions
• Discrete-Time Approximations of the Holmstrom-Milgrom Brownian-Motion Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision
• A solvable time-inconsistent principal-agent problem
• Gaussian agency problems with memory and linear contracts
• Optimal contracting with moral hazard and behavioral preferences
• Dynamic programming approach to principal-agent problems
• Optimal contracting under mean-volatility joint ambiguity uncertainties
• The first-best sharing rule in the continuous-time principal-agent problem with exponential utility
• A continuous-time version of a delegated asset management problem
• The first-order approach to the continuous-time principal-agent problem with exponential utility

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