On optimal sharing rules in discrete- and continuous-time principal-agent problems with exponential utility

DOI10.1016/S0165-1889(96)00944-XMaRDI QIDQ673263zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Heinz Schättler, Jaeyoung Sung

Publication date 28 February 1997

Published in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1889(96)00944-x

zbMATH Keywords

Stochastic controlDynamic programmingAgency problemsContinuous-time principal-agent problemsContractsIncentives

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3505708 (Why is no real title available?)
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I
• The first-order approach to the continuous-time principal-agent problem with exponential utility

Cited in

(21)

• Incentives and individual motivation in supervised work groups
• A principal-agent problem in continuous time
• Dynamic contracting: accidents lead to nonlinear contracts
• The design and performance of sharing rules for a partnership in continuous time
• Dynamic optimal contract under parameter uncertainty with risk-averse agent and principal
• Optimal contracting with effort and misvaluation
• Contracting theory with competitive interacting agents
• Risk-sharing and optimal contracts with large exogenous risks
• Time-inconsistent contract theory
• On the first-order approach in principal-agent models with hidden borrowing and lending
• Optimal compensation with adverse selection and dynamic actions
• A Tale of a Principal and Many, Many Agents
• A solvable time-inconsistent principal-agent problem
• Discrete-Time Approximations of the Holmstrom-Milgrom Brownian-Motion Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision
• Optimal contracting with moral hazard and behavioral preferences
• Gaussian agency problems with memory and linear contracts
• Dynamic programming approach to principal-agent problems
• Optimal contracting under mean-volatility joint ambiguity uncertainties
• The first-best sharing rule in the continuous-time principal-agent problem with exponential utility
• A continuous-time version of a delegated asset management problem
• The first-order approach to the continuous-time principal-agent problem with exponential utility

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