The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
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Publication:3696798
DOI10.2307/1913212zbMath0576.90005OpenAlexW2080220927MaRDI QIDQ3696798
Publication date: 1985
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1913212
first-order approachprincipal-agent problemsconvexity of the distribution function conditionmonotone likelihood ratio conditionPareto- optimal wage contract
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