On the first-order approach in principal-agent models with hidden borrowing and lending

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.002zbMath1230.91091MaRDI QIDQ634506

Nicola Pavoni, Sebastian Koehne, Árpád Ábrahám

Publication date: 16 August 2011

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.002

zbMATH Keywords

first-order approach; log-convexity; moral hazard; hidden savings

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B70: Stochastic models in economics

91B16: Utility theory

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