Two New Conditions Supporting the First-Order Approach to Multisignal Principal-Agent Problems
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Publication:3627282
DOI10.3982/ECTA6688zbMath1160.91314OpenAlexW2109269924MaRDI QIDQ3627282
Publication date: 18 May 2009
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta6688
Utility theory (91B16) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)
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