Characterizing optimal wages in principal-agent problems without using the first-order approach

DOI10.1080/02331934.2015.1059837zbMath1369.91116OpenAlexW2199007941MaRDI QIDQ2790890

Mostafa Nasri

Publication date: 8 March 2016

Published in: Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/02331934.2015.1059837

zbMATH Keywords

dualityfirst-order approachsemi-infinite programmingmonotone likelihood ratioprincipal-agent problemconvexity of the distribution function condition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Semi-infinite programming (90C34)

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Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• The principal/agent paradigm: Its relevance to various functional fields
• Semi-Infinite Programming: Theory, Methods, and Applications
• On duality theory of convex semi-infinite programming
• Two New Conditions Supporting the First-Order Approach to Multisignal Principal-Agent Problems
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Competition and Efficiency in Congested Markets

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