The principal/agent paradigm: Its relevance to various functional fields
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Publication:1309986
DOI10.1016/0377-2217(93)90234-EzbMATH Open0800.90271OpenAlexW1987352215MaRDI QIDQ1309986FDOQ1309986
Authors: A. van Ackere 
Publication date: 20 December 1993
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0377-2217(93)90234-e
Social choice (91B14) Theory of organizations, manpower planning in operations research (90B70) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)
Cites Work
- Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting
- An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
- Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts
- Delegated portfolio management
- Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
- Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships
- The Multiperiod Principal-Agent Problem
- Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping
- Conflicting Interests in the Timing of Jobs
- Piecewise Linear Incentive Schemes
Cited In (16)
- Stackelberg equilibria in managerial delegation games
- Reducing incremental costs associated with the delegation of incentive contracting decisions: An analysis of planning and control decisions in a manufacturing setting in the presence of moral hazard
- Price-volume agreements: a one principal/two agents model
- Levitin-Polyak well-posedness for strong bilevel vector equilibrium problems and applications to traffic network problems with equilibrium constraints
- Percentage rent contracts between co-stores
- Bilevel Programming: The Montreal School
- Optimal shared-savings contracts in supply chains: linear contracts and double moral hazard
- A multi-criteria agency model with incomplete preference information.
- Optimal contract design in the joint economic lot size problem with multi-dimensional asymmetric information
- The complementarity effect: effort and sharing in the entrepreneur and venture capital contract
- An overview of bilevel optimization
- Bilevel programming and price setting problems
- Response time and vendor-assembler relationship in a supply chain
- Product warranty logistics: issues and challenges.
- Bilevel programming and price setting problems
- Characterizing optimal wages in principal-agent problems without using the first-order approach
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