The principal/agent paradigm: Its relevance to various functional fields

DOI10.1016/0377-2217(93)90234-EMaRDI QIDQ1309986zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors A. van Ackere

Publication date 20 December 1993

Published in European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0377-2217(93)90234-e

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Theory of organizations, manpower planning in operations research (90B70) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)

Cites work

• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Conflicting Interests in the Timing of Jobs
• Delegated portfolio management
• Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping
• Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts
• Piecewise Linear Incentive Schemes
• Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting
• Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships
• The Multiperiod Principal-Agent Problem

Cited in

(16)

• Response time and vendor-assembler relationship in a supply chain
• Levitin-Polyak well-posedness for strong bilevel vector equilibrium problems and applications to traffic network problems with equilibrium constraints
• Bilevel Programming: The Montreal School
• Product warranty logistics: issues and challenges.
• Price-volume agreements: a one principal/two agents model
• Stackelberg equilibria in managerial delegation games
• A multi-criteria agency model with incomplete preference information.
• An overview of bilevel optimization
• Optimal contract design in the joint economic lot size problem with multi-dimensional asymmetric information
• The complementarity effect: effort and sharing in the entrepreneur and venture capital contract
• Reducing incremental costs associated with the delegation of incentive contracting decisions: An analysis of planning and control decisions in a manufacturing setting in the presence of moral hazard
• Bilevel programming and price setting problems
• Optimal shared-savings contracts in supply chains: linear contracts and double moral hazard
• Percentage rent contracts between co-stores
• Characterizing optimal wages in principal-agent problems without using the first-order approach
• Bilevel programming and price setting problems

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