Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping

DOI10.2307/2296714MaRDI QIDQ4178749zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Joseph E. Stiglitz

Publication date 1974

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d03/d0353.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Sharecropping

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical economics (91B99)

Cited in

(18)

• Stochastic specification of production functions and economic implications
• A general equilibrium model of production with a random marginal rate of substitution
• Escalator clauses and the allocation of cyclical risks
• Profit-maximizing design of enterprises through incentives
• Linear contracts and the double moral-hazard
• The principal/agent paradigm: Its relevance to various functional fields
• Work quality and optimal pay structure: Piece vs. hourly rates in employee remuneration
• Percentage rent contracts between co-stores
• A measure of total firm performance: new insights for the corporate objective
• A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF A MULTIFIRM MORAL-HAZARD ECONOMY WITH FINANCIAL MARKETS
• On the optimum financial environment for worker cooperatives
• Two-stage pricing for custom-made products
• Stochastic programming perspective on the agency problems under uncertainty
• Modeling frost losses: application to pricing frost insurance
• A DYNAMICAL ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF AGRICULTURAL LAND TENURE
• Bounds on the welfare loss from moral hazard with limited liability
• Learning by doing vs. learning from others in a principal-agent model
• Fairness and incentive compatibility via percentage fees

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