Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping
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Publication:4178749
DOI10.2307/2296714zbMATH Open0395.90025OpenAlexW1858733141WikidataQ55922621 ScholiaQ55922621MaRDI QIDQ4178749FDOQ4178749
Authors: Joseph E. Stiglitz 
Publication date: 1974
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d03/d0353.pdf
Cited In (17)
- Escalator clauses and the allocation of cyclical risks
- A general equilibrium model of production with a random marginal rate of substitution
- A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF A MULTIFIRM MORAL-HAZARD ECONOMY WITH FINANCIAL MARKETS
- Linear contracts and the double moral-hazard
- Work quality and optimal pay structure: Piece vs. hourly rates in employee remuneration
- Stochastic specification of production functions and economic implications
- Modeling frost losses: application to pricing frost insurance
- Percentage rent contracts between co-stores
- Two-stage pricing for custom-made products
- A DYNAMICAL ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF AGRICULTURAL LAND TENURE
- Learning by doing vs. learning from others in a principal-agent model
- Profit-maximizing design of enterprises through incentives
- Bounds on the welfare loss from moral hazard with limited liability
- On the optimum financial environment for worker cooperatives
- A measure of total firm performance: new insights for the corporate objective
- The principal/agent paradigm: Its relevance to various functional fields
- Stochastic programming perspective on the agency problems under uncertainty
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