Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping
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Publication:4178749
DOI10.2307/2296714zbMath0395.90025OpenAlexW1858733141WikidataQ55922621 ScholiaQ55922621MaRDI QIDQ4178749
Publication date: 1974
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d03/d0353.pdf
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