Bounds on the welfare loss from moral hazard with limited liability
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Publication:5964694
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.008zbMath1347.91179OpenAlexW1756357714WikidataQ65553889 ScholiaQ65553889MaRDI QIDQ5964694
José R. Correa, Felipe Balmaceda, Santiago R. Balseiro, Nicolás E. Stier-Moses
Publication date: 1 March 2016
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.008
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