Renegotiating moral hazard contracts under limited liability and monotonicity

DOI10.1006/jeth.2000.2726zbMath0987.91043OpenAlexW2028807392MaRDI QIDQ5937314

Steven A. Matthews

Publication date: 12 July 2001

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2726

zbMATH Keywords

debtPareto domination and equilibriumrenegotiation moral hazard contract

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (7)

Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard ⋮ Minimum payments and induced effort in moral hazard problems ⋮ Moral hazard with bounded payments ⋮ Bounds on the welfare loss from moral hazard with limited liability ⋮ Multitask principal-agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation ⋮ The risk-sharing problem under limited liability constraints in a single-period model ⋮ Contracting with moral hazard, adverse selection and risk neutrality: when does one size fit all?

Cites Work

• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• Moral hazard, renegotiation and debt
• Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts
• Moral Hazard and Verifiability: The Effects of Renegotiation in Agency
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Renegotiation and Optimality in Agency Contracts
• Stage Financing and the Role of Convertible Securities
• Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?
• Renegotiation of Sales Contracts

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