Moral Hazard and Verifiability: The Effects of Renegotiation in Agency

DOI10.2307/2938287MaRDI QIDQ3356089zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Benjamin Hermalin, Michael L. Katz

Publication date 1991

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1678w3w9

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical economics (91B99) Economics of information (91B44)

Cited in

(16)

• Two-sided unobservable investment, bargaining, and efficiency
• A characterization of verifiability and observability in contracts
• Quality distortions in vertical relations
• Ambiguous contracts
• After you Sir. Hold-up, direct externalities, and sequential investment
• Efficiency in sequential partnerships
• Algorithmic contract theory: a survey
• Co-investment deterrence
• Moral hazard with non-additive uncertainty: when are actions implementable?
• Renegotiation-proof contract in repeated agency
• Moral hazard, renegotiation and debt
• Renegotiating moral hazard contracts under limited liability and monotonicity
• Delegating trial and error
• On the welfare effects of allowing unlimited renegotiation in agency relationships
• Overconfidence and moral hazard without commitment
• Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach

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