Moral Hazard and Verifiability: The Effects of Renegotiation in Agency
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Publication:3356089
DOI10.2307/2938287zbMATH Open0729.91016OpenAlexW3124209791MaRDI QIDQ3356089FDOQ3356089
Authors: Benjamin Hermalin, Michael L. Katz 
Publication date: 1991
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1678w3w9
Cited In (13)
- Two-sided unobservable investment, bargaining, and efficiency
- Quality distortions in vertical relations
- After you Sir. Hold-up, direct externalities, and sequential investment
- Efficiency in sequential partnerships
- Co-investment deterrence
- Moral hazard with non-additive uncertainty: when are actions implementable?
- A Characterization of Verifiability and Observability in Contracts
- Renegotiating moral hazard contracts under limited liability and monotonicity
- Renegotiation-proof contract in repeated agency
- Moral hazard, renegotiation and debt
- Delegating trial and error
- On the welfare effects of allowing unlimited renegotiation in agency relationships
- Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach
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