Two-sided unobservable investment, bargaining, and efficiency

DOI10.1007/s10058-018-0213-4zbMath1422.91285OpenAlexW2887495784MaRDI QIDQ2318134

Adam Meirowitz, Kristopher W. Ramsay, Erol Akçay

Publication date: 13 August 2019

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-018-0213-4

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingstrategic uncertaintyhold-up

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

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