Renegotiation and Optimality in Agency Contracts
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Publication:4282694
DOI10.2307/2297879zbMath0790.90022OpenAlexW2079497775MaRDI QIDQ4282694
Publication date: 23 June 1994
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297879
Related Items (8)
Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information ⋮ An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values ⋮ The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability ⋮ Bargaining power choices with moral hazard in a supply chain ⋮ Renegotiating moral hazard contracts under limited liability and monotonicity ⋮ Contract design and bargaining power ⋮ Two-sided unobservable investment, bargaining, and efficiency ⋮ Optimal timing of management turnover under agency problems
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