Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2007.06.007zbMATH Open1255.91214OpenAlexW3123804163MaRDI QIDQ1934720FDOQ1934720

Authors: Patrick W. Schmitz 

Publication date: 29 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.06.007

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zbMATH Keywords

hold-up problemincomplete contractsinvestment incentives

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems
• Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts
• Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?
• Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem
• Implementation and Renegotiation
• Foundations of Incomplete Contracts
• Renegotiation and Optimality in Agency Contracts
• After you Sir. Hold-up, direct externalities, and sequential investment

Cited In (21)

• Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments
• Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information
• Opportunism and the Dynamics of Incomplete Contracts
• Hold-up, asset ownership, and reference points
• Incomplete contract, transaction-specific investment, and bargaining power
• On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems
• On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries
• Incentive contracting with asymmetric and imperfect precontractual knowledge
• Insiders and outsiders and efficient asymmetric information contracts
• \textit{Ex ante} investment, \textit{ex post} adaptation, and joint ownership
• Hold-up in vertical hierarchies with adverse selection
• Information gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting framework
• Contractual signaling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements
• A dynamic game model for a class of venture investment behaviors
• Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem
• Representation and warranty clause and disclosure of information in acquisitions
• The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability
• Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information
• Unobservable Investment and the Hold-Up Problem
• Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information
• INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS MODELLING

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