Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2007.06.007MaRDI QIDQ1934720zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Patrick W. Schmitz

Publication date 29 January 2013

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.06.007

zbMATH Keywords

hold-up problemincomplete contractsinvestment incentives

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1323215 (Why is no real title available?)
• After you Sir. Hold-up, direct externalities, and sequential investment
• Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem
• Foundations of Incomplete Contracts
• Implementation and Renegotiation
• Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?
• On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems
• Renegotiation and Optimality in Agency Contracts
• Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts

Cited in

(21)

• Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem
• Insiders and outsiders and efficient asymmetric information contracts
• Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information
• The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability
• A dynamic game model for a class of venture investment behaviors
• Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information
• Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments
• On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries
• Incentive contracting with asymmetric and imperfect precontractual knowledge
• Representation and warranty clause and disclosure of information in acquisitions
• Unobservable Investment and the Hold-Up Problem
• Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information
• \textit{Ex ante} investment, \textit{ex post} adaptation, and joint ownership
• INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS MODELLING
• Incomplete contract, transaction-specific investment, and bargaining power
• Hold-up in vertical hierarchies with adverse selection
• On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems
• Hold-up, asset ownership, and reference points
• Contractual signaling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements
• Opportunism and the Dynamics of Incomplete Contracts
• Information gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting framework

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