Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information
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Publication:1934720
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2007.06.007zbMath1255.91214OpenAlexW3123804163MaRDI QIDQ1934720
Publication date: 29 January 2013
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.06.007
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Related Items (6)
Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments ⋮ Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information ⋮ The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability ⋮ On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries ⋮ \textit{Ex ante} investment, \textit{ex post} adaptation, and joint ownership ⋮ On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems
Cites Work
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- After you Sir. Hold-up, direct externalities, and sequential investment
- On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems
- Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem
- Implementation and Renegotiation
- Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts
- Foundations of Incomplete Contracts
- Renegotiation and Optimality in Agency Contracts
- Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?
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