\textit{Ex ante} investment, \textit{ex post} adaptation, and joint ownership
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Publication:2295368
DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2019.108927zbMATH Open1431.91203OpenAlexW3125255085WikidataQ126469195 ScholiaQ126469195MaRDI QIDQ2295368FDOQ2295368
Authors: Yusuke Mori 
Publication date: 13 February 2020
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108927
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Cites Work
- Does Asset Ownership Always Motivate Managers? Outside Options and the Property Rights Theory of the Firm
- Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information
- Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information
- Asymmetric information and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm
- Investments as signals of outside options
- Moral hazard and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm
Cited In (5)
- EX ANTE INVESTMENT, EX POST REMEDIES, AND PRODUCT LIABILITY*
- On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries
- Incomplete contracts, limited liability, and the optimality of joint ownership
- Investment spillovers and the allocation of property rights
- The management of innovation: experimental evidence
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