The management of innovation: experimental evidence

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.06.011MaRDI QIDQ2013380zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors David J. Kusterer, Patrick W. Schmitz

Publication date 17 August 2017

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.011

zbMATH Keywords

laboratory experimentsproperty rightsincomplete contractsinvestment incentives

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Experimental studies (91A90)

Recommendations

• The Management of Innovation
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• COMPETITION IN PRODUCT DESIGN: AN EXPERIMENT EXPLORING INNOVATION BEHAVIOR
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1323215 (Why is no real title available?)
• Does Asset Ownership Always Motivate Managers? Outside Options and the Property Rights Theory of the Firm
• Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
• Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?
• Investments as signals of outside options
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Promises and Partnership
• The Management of Innovation

Cited in

(2)

• Competition and innovation: An experimental investigation
• The Management of Innovation

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