Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?
From MaRDI portal
Cited in
(38)- Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments
- Dynamic bargaining with action-dependent valuations
- INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS MODELLING
- Time-inconsistent bargaining and cross-commitments
- Bargaining power and renegotiation of small private debt contracts
- A theory of debt maturity and innovation
- A characterization of verifiability and observability in contracts
- A behavioral definition of unforeseen contingencies
- Indescribability and its irrelevance for contractual incompleteness
- Towards a Bayesian theory of second-order uncertainty: lessons from non-standard logics
- Contractual incompleteness as a signal of trust
- Why sunk costs matter for bargaining outcomes: An evolutionary approach
- Contracting for technology improvement: the effect of asymmetric bargaining power and investment uncertainty
- On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems
- Renegotiation design with multiple regulators
- Indescribability and asymmetric information at the contracting stage
- Incomplete contracts with disparity, uncertainty, information and incentives
- Staged financing: a trade-off theory of holdup and option value
- Incomplete contracts, limited liability, and the optimality of joint ownership
- Surplus division and investment incentives in supply chains: a biform-game analysis
- Optimal voting rules for two-member tenure committees
- Decentralization of contracts with interim side-contracting
- Framing contingencies in contracts
- Can a free market be complete?
- Information gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting framework
- Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R\&D alliances.
- Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach
- Renegotiating moral hazard contracts under limited liability and monotonicity
- Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information
- Moral hazard and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm
- The management of innovation: experimental evidence
- Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information
- Incentivizing research with (un)conditional teaching duties: punishment or rent extraction?
- Incorporating unawareness into contract theory
- Task scheduling and moral hazard
- On efficient firm formation
- Mining for Unknown Unknowns
- Stochastic programming perspective on the agency problems under uncertainty
This page was built for publication: Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4799858)
