Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2007.10.008MaRDI QIDQ1934817zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Patrick W. Schmitz

Publication date 29 January 2013

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.10.008

zbMATH Keywords

investment incentivesjoint ownershipproperty rights

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Recommendations

• Asymmetric information and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm
• Incomplete contracts, limited liability, and the optimality of joint ownership
• Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information
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• Two Remarks on the Property-Rights Literature

Cites work

• Foundations of Incomplete Contracts
• Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?
• Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts
• Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R\&D alliances.
• The Management of Innovation
• Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts

Cited in

(21)

• Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts
• Asset ownership and the threat to sell
• The negotiators who knew too much: transaction costs and incomplete information
• Investment spillovers and the allocation of property rights
• Conditions for asymmetric information solutions when alliances provide acquisition options and due diligence
• Asymmetric information and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm
• Cross-holdings with asymmetric information and technologies
• On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries
• Optimal ownership in joint ventures with contributions of asymmetric partners
• \textit{Ex ante} investment, \textit{ex post} adaptation, and joint ownership
• Incomplete contracts, limited liability, and the optimality of joint ownership
• Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach
• Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information
• Bargained shares in joint ventures among asymmetric partners: Is the Matthew effect catalyzing?
• Two Remarks on the Property-Rights Literature
• Completely relationship-specific investments, transaction costs, and the property rights theory
• Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments
• Incomplete property rights and overinvestment
• Partnerships based on joint ownership
• When should the government own the physical assets needed to provide public goods?
• Public-private partnerships, asymmetric information, and incomplete contracts

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