Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information
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Publication:1934817
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2007.10.008zbMath1255.91192OpenAlexW3124647371MaRDI QIDQ1934817
Publication date: 29 January 2013
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.10.008
Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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