Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00038-5zbMATH Open0924.90031OpenAlexW3125952373WikidataQ57486279 ScholiaQ57486279MaRDI QIDQ1292452FDOQ1292452

Authors: Stephanie Rosenkranz, Patrick W. Schmitz 

Publication date: 21 June 1999

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(99)00038-5

Recommendations

• Incomplete contracts, limited liability, and the optimality of joint ownership
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• The negotiators who knew too much: transaction costs and incomplete information
• INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS MODELLING

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete contractsjoint ownershipknow-how disclosure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Cites Work

• Does Asset Ownership Always Motivate Managers? Outside Options and the Property Rights Theory of the Firm
• Licensing and the sharing of knowledge in research joint ventures

Cited In (5)

• The Sale of Ideas: Strategic Disclosure, Property Rights, and Contracting
• On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries
• Investment spillovers and the allocation of property rights
• Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R\&D alliances.
• Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information

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