Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00038-5MaRDI QIDQ1292452zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Stephanie Rosenkranz, Patrick W. Schmitz

Publication date 21 June 1999

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(99)00038-5

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete contractsjoint ownershipknow-how disclosure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

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Cites work

• Does Asset Ownership Always Motivate Managers? Outside Options and the Property Rights Theory of the Firm
• Licensing and the sharing of knowledge in research joint ventures

Cited in

(5)

• Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information
• On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries
• The Sale of Ideas: Strategic Disclosure, Property Rights, and Contracting
• Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R\&D alliances.
• Investment spillovers and the allocation of property rights

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