Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R\&D alliances.
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Publication:1399530
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00553-5zbMath1048.91007OpenAlexW3122020655WikidataQ57486282 ScholiaQ57486282MaRDI QIDQ1399530
Stephanie Rosenkranz, Patrick W. Schmitz
Publication date: 30 July 2003
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(02)00553-5
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