Sequential investments, know-how transmission, and optimal organization

DOI10.2202/1935-1704.1748zbMATH Open1277.91118OpenAlexW2043413571MaRDI QIDQ2867459FDOQ2867459

Authors: Tsung-Sheng Tsai, Sheng-Chiao Kung 

Publication date: 19 December 2013

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1748

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zbMATH Keywords

sequential investmentsoptimal organizationknow-how transmission

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R\&D alliances.

Cited In (2)

• Investment in process innovation in supply chains with knowledge spillovers under innovation uncertainty
• Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted

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