Dynamic moral hazard with sequential tasks

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2019.108606MaRDI QIDQ2324717zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Başak Altan

Publication date 12 September 2019

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108606

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardoptimal contractsequential tasks

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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Cites work

• Job design with sequential tasks and outcome externalities revisited

Cited in

(10)

• Work incentives and household insurance: sequential contracting with altruistic individuals and moral hazard
• Job design with sequential tasks and outcome externalities revisited
• Dynamic moral hazard without commitment
• Sequential investments, know-how transmission, and optimal organization
• Timing of Effort and Reward: Three-Sided Moral Hazard in a Continuous-Time Model
• Dynamic costs and moral hazard: a duality-based approach
• Dynamic contracts with moral hazard and adverse selection
• Incentives, project choice, and dynamic multitasking
• Technical Note—Dynamic Mechanism Design with Capacity Constraint
• Task scheduling and moral hazard

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