Task scheduling and moral hazard
From MaRDI portal
Publication:946362
DOI10.1007/s00199-007-0305-9zbMath1167.90006MaRDI QIDQ946362
Patrick W. Schmitz, Tymofiy Mylovanov
Publication date: 23 September 2008
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0305-9
90B35: Deterministic scheduling theory in operations research
90B90: Case-oriented studies in operations research
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