Arm's Length Relationships

DOI10.2307/2118440MaRDI QIDQ4845244zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jacques Crémer

Publication date 4 September 1995

Published in The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2118440

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

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Cited in

(20)

• Private versus verifiable interim performance evaluations under uncertainty
• Participation in moral hazard problems
• Optimal transparency of monitoring capability
• Delegation and motivation
• Decision-making in organizations: when to delegate and whom to delegate
• Volunteering and the strategic value of ignorance
• Experimentation with reputation concerns -- dynamic signalling with changing types
• Renegotiation design with multiple regulators
• Long-term relationships as safeguards
• Purchasing sleeping patents to curtail budget padding
• Persuasion and receiver's news
• Price signaling and the strategic benefits of price rigidities
• Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design
• Discretionary acquisition of firm-specific human capital under non-verifiable performance
• Strategic obscurity in the forecasting of disasters
• Even up: maintaining relationships
• Limited cognitive ability and selective information processing
• Mixed up? That's good for motivation
• Task scheduling and moral hazard
• The strategically ignorant principal

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