Arm's Length Relationships
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Publication:4845244
Recommendations
- On the role of commitment in a principal-agent relationship with an informed principal
- On the Value of Commitment with Asymmetric Information
- The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
- A principal-agent relationship with no advantage to commitment
- A theory of credibility under commitment
Cited in
(21)- Price signaling and the strategic benefits of price rigidities
- Persuasion and receiver's news
- Discretionary acquisition of firm-specific human capital under non-verifiable performance
- Experimentation with reputation concerns -- dynamic signalling with changing types
- Renegotiation design with multiple regulators
- Purchasing sleeping patents to curtail budget padding
- Delegation and motivation
- Limited cognitive ability and selective information processing
- Even up: maintaining relationships
- Volunteering and the strategic value of ignorance
- Mixed up? That's good for motivation
- Private versus verifiable interim performance evaluations under uncertainty
- Performance in Principal-Agent Dyads: The Causes and Consequences of Perceived Asymmetry of Commitment to the Relationship
- Strategic obscurity in the forecasting of disasters
- The strategically ignorant principal
- Participation in moral hazard problems
- Optimal transparency of monitoring capability
- Decision-making in organizations: when to delegate and whom to delegate
- Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design
- Task scheduling and moral hazard
- Long-term relationships as safeguards
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