The strategically ignorant principal

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.02.010MaRDI QIDQ523523zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Nicholas C. Bedard

Publication date 21 April 2017

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.010

zbMATH Keywords

informed principal problemmechanism designvalue of information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
• Information Control in the Principal-Agent Problem
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
• On the role of commitment in a principal-agent relationship with an informed principal
• Risky allocations from a risk-neutral informed principal

Cites work

• A model of insurance markets with incomplete information
• A note on the Seller's optimal mechanism in bilateral trade with two-sided incomplete information
• Arm's Length Relationships
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
• Game theory
• Informed principal and countervailing incentives
• Informed principal with correlation
• Informed principal, moral hazard, and the value of a more informative technology
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
• On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure
• Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
• The value of information in a principal-agent model with moral hazard: the ex post contracting case
• Why an Informed Principal May Leave Rents to an Agent

Cited in

(4)

• Informed principal problems in bilateral trading
• Strategic obscurity in the forecasting of disasters
• Information Control in the Principal-Agent Problem
• On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals

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