Information Control in the Principal-Agent Problem
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5288084
DOI10.2307/2526911zbMath0771.90014MaRDI QIDQ5288084
Publication date: 30 September 1993
Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2526911
91A65: Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games)
93A13: Hierarchical systems
91B44: Economics of information
Related Items
Informed principal, moral hazard, and the value of a more informative technology, The value of information in a principal-agent model with moral hazard: the ex post contracting case, The value of information for auctioneers, Contracts with endogenous information, Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered, Contracts and productive information gathering, Pessimistic information gathering, GATHERING INFORMATION BY A PARTIALLY INFORMED AGENT