Information Control in the Principal-Agent Problem

DOI10.2307/2526911MaRDI QIDQ5288084zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Joel Sobel

Publication date 30 September 1993

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2526911

zbMATH Keywords

principal-agent modelsdifferent informational assumptions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Economics of information (91B44) Hierarchical systems (93A13)

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Cited in

(28)

• The value of information in a principal-agent model with moral hazard: the ex post contracting case
• Informed principal, moral hazard, and the value of a more informative technology
• Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values
• Information provision before a contract is offered
• Informational control and organizational design
• The use of an agent in a signalling model
• Information, risk sharing, and incentives in agency problems
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5625515 (Why is no real title available?)
• The value of information for auctioneers
• Contracts with endogenous information
• Informed principal with correlation
• A multi-criteria agency model with incomplete preference information.
• Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered
• Contracts and productive information gathering
• Pessimistic information gathering
• Informed principal and information gathering agent
• An information inequality for agency problems
• Principals and agents: does the assignment of information matter?
• Concordant informational control
• Principal and expert agent
• Optimal limited authority for principal
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1779930 (Why is no real title available?)
• GATHERING INFORMATION BY A PARTIALLY INFORMED AGENT
• The value of preference information in agency relationships
• The Economics of Clear Advice and Extreme Options
• The costs and benefits of additional information in agency models with endogenous information structures
• On selecting the right agent
• The strategically ignorant principal

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