Information Control in the Principal-Agent Problem
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Publication:5288084
DOI10.2307/2526911zbMATH Open0771.90014OpenAlexW1977157597MaRDI QIDQ5288084FDOQ5288084
Authors: Joel Sobel 
Publication date: 30 September 1993
Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2526911
Recommendations
Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Economics of information (91B44) Hierarchical systems (93A13)
Cited In (21)
- The value of information in a principal-agent model with moral hazard: the ex post contracting case
- Informed principal, moral hazard, and the value of a more informative technology
- Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values
- Informational control and organizational design
- The use of an agent in a signalling model
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- The value of information for auctioneers
- Contracts with endogenous information
- Informed principal with correlation
- A multi-criteria agency model with incomplete preference information.
- Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered
- Contracts and productive information gathering
- Pessimistic information gathering
- Informed principal and information gathering agent
- Concordant informational control
- Principal and expert agent
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- GATHERING INFORMATION BY A PARTIALLY INFORMED AGENT
- The value of preference information in agency relationships
- The Economics of Clear Advice and Extreme Options
- The costs and benefits of additional information in agency models with endogenous information structures
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