Principals and agents: does the assignment of information matter?

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(90)90005-LzbMATH Open1375.91143OpenAlexW1577947897MaRDI QIDQ1676740FDOQ1676740

Authors: Julianne Nelson 

Publication date: 9 November 2017

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(90)90005-l

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• Information Control in the Principal-Agent Problem
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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information

Cited In (2)

• Informed agent's advice in bargaining under two-sided incomplete information
• Why an Informed Principal May Leave Rents to an Agent

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