The costs and benefits of additional information in agency models with endogenous information structures

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2009.12.026MaRDI QIDQ969480zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Eva I. Hoppe, Patrick W. Schmitz

Publication date 7 May 2010

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2009.12.026

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectionhidden informationinformation gathering

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Information Control in the Principal-Agent Problem
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Cites work

• Contracts and productive information gathering
• Optimal Auction Design
• Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered

Cited in

(7)

• Endogeneous information quality: a job-assignment application
• The value of preference information in agency relationships
• On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries
• Ex Post Private Information and Monopolistic Screening
• Wholesale-price contract of supply chain with information gathering
• Information provision before a contract is offered
• Who benefits from covert evidence acquisition in principal-agent interactions?

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